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Law and Rhetoric: Critical Possibilities
John Harrington,* Lucy Series,* and
Alexander Ruck-Keene**
What contribution can rhetoric make to socio-legal studies? Though
now a byword for deception and spin, rhetoric was long identified with
the very substance of law and politics. Latterly radical scholars have
foregrounded an understanding of law as rhetoric in their polemics
against legal formalism, but it needs to be complemented by a critical
perspective which goes beyond simple revivalism, taking account of
rhetoric's own blind spots, inquiring into the means by which some
speakers and listeners are privileged and others excluded or silenced.
The critical potential of legal rhetoric is tested here through a review
of the developing law on mental capacity and the best interests of
people with disabilities in England and Wales. Much of what is at stake
there is properly grasped in terms of a politics of speech: who is
addressed, who can speak, who must speak, and how are they
represented in judicial and media discourse.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays `rhetoric' is a term of abuse in legal scholarship as in wider
political discourse. A recent survey of law journal articles suggests that it is
usually counterposed, negatively, with the term `reality'.1 Rhetoric is anti-
fact: mere ornament, lies and spin. Opponents of contemporary political
populism, for instance, impugn the idiom as much as the substance of
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neonationalism in the United States, Britain, and continental Europe. For
them, rhetoric describes what comes out of the heated chambers of social
media, the late-night tweets of demagogues. This scepticism and anxiety has
accompanied rhetoric since its origins in ancient Greece. It is the burden of
Plato's criticisms in the Gorgias. A tool crafted by amoral technicians and
put at the service of rabble rousers, rhetoric was no more than a `flattery' of
logic.2
What does it mean to study of law rhetorically? Let's start with a
distinction: between rhetorical technique and rhetorical criticism. The former
chiefly includes tactics for effective persuasion ± a guide, a toolbox, a crib
for effective verbal performance: How Aristotle can Help you to Win Friends
and Influence People or The Best Man's Duties. All this has its place in
training for advocacy and public speaking, but, as socio-legal scholars, it
need not detain us too long. The latter is our sole focus here. Standing back
from verbal tactics, rhetorical criticism involves inquiry into the textual and
contextual preconditions for persuasive speech. Criticism has two senses
here: the informed and attentive reading of legal materials, as in literary or
cultural studies; but also, the engaged study of how social and political forms
are produced, reproduced, modified, and challenged in the substance of legal
speech and legal writing. To emphasize: both modes are closely intertwined.
Style, for instance, needs to be grasped as regards its formal properties, but
also politically with a view to how it sustains inequalities of voice and
power.
In the following sections we consider the origins, decline, and revival of
rhetoric generally and in law in particular. We argue that classical rhetoric
still offers useful tools to socio-legal scholars for reading the output of
courts, lawmakers, citizens, and legal activists. We note the influential turn
to classical rhetoric in the United States in the early twentieth century and
the limited purposes of that retrieval, purposes which were undermined by
the emergence of a much more wide-ranging critical rhetoric in the 1960s.
The critical challenge points to the political exclusions of classical rhetoric,
in terms of race, class, and gender. It suggests moreover a wider circle of
political concern and an augmented analytical repertoire for studying
contemporary speech in law and related domains. We then gather together
the insights of classical and critical rhetoric, deploying each in order to
illuminate struggles over speech and representation in the area of mental
capacity law. Ethical and legal debates concerning individual autonomy,
medical paternalism, and judicial power, resolve into fundamentally
rhetorical questions over who speaks and how are they represented, who is
addressed and who silenced. In sum we hope to show that critical rhetorical
analysis offers a mode of accounting for law as politics, including its relation
to wider social and cultural contexts, which takes the agency of legal actors
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seriously and which pays due attention to the provisional and creative nature
of legal argumentation.
REPUDIATING AND RECOVERING
The study of rhetoric in Europe dates back to classical Greece, with
Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric being a key text, and to Roman authors such as
Cicero and Quintilian.3 Classical rhetoric was a staple of education for
lawyers and other professionals in Europe until the rise of rationalism in the
seventeenth and eighteenth century.4 From this period, it fell into decay,
being increasingly cast as a literary supplement to empiricist and rationalist
philosophy. Writers from Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham to John
Rawls defined their work as against rhetoric, offering instead rational
theories of sovereignty, legislation, political morality, and so on.5 The
attractions of their theses would lie in indisputable empirical data regarding
human nature and society, or in the logical coherence of their a priori
schemes and thought experiments. By contrast, as John Locke had it,
eloquence and figurative speech served no other purpose than 'to insinuate
wrong ideas, move the passions and thereby mislead the judgment, and so
are perfect cheats.'6 Modern law and legal theory, in most of their dominant
forms, have also participated in this embrace of rationalism and in the
repudiation of their own traditions. The perceived amorality of rhetoric put it
at odds with natural law thought which sought to anchor legal reasoning,
somehow, in a higher order. Its provisional, situation-bound quality militated
against the systemic order and purity valued by codifiers and textbook
writers. Romantic opposition to literary rhetoric as artificial, technical, and
purely ornamental, registered even more in the case of law, where these
attributes suggested a lack of seriousness and an avoidance of profound, core
issues.7 By turns plural, playful, and polemical, it threatened to disrupt the
sober speech of the law.8
There are two sources for this repudiation, according to James Boyd
White: the Christian tradition in which law is a set of authoritative com-
mands; and modernist sociology which sees it as a system of institutionally
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established and managed rules.9 Taken in combination they presuppose an
instrumental view of law with little room left over for rhetoric, which lives
on only as the other of scientific legal studies. The law in this mode is ideally
a system of rules which are pre-given and whose meaning is to be found
through exegesis rather than actively created in the process of argu-
mentation.10 Legal scholarship specializes in this task, promoting the unity
of the system through correcting errors and integrating new developments in
doctrine. In so far as it draws on other disciplines, it favours those which
offer determinate, exclusive answers, for example, neo-classical economics,
and spurns those associated with openness and complexity, for example,
literary studies.11 Legal theory serves similar ends by sharply delimiting the
`province of jurisprudence' (John Austin) or elaborating a `pure theory of
law' (Hans Kelsen).12 Of course, in a familiar irony, this denial of rhetoric is
itself an obviously rhetorical move. Law performs its own authority and self-
sufficiency in text and speech through a neutral style and a coercive idiom
(`it cannot be denied', `no one can doubt', and so on).13 In aiming at closure
it rations speech, dominating or marginalizing non-legal languages and those
who bear them. Legal education involves above all imparting this stylistic
repertoire and the hierarchy of voice which goes with it, embodied traits
which are retained long after the substantive matter of the syllabus has been
forgotten.14
Rhetoric takes ideas and culture seriously as integral to social practices,
including law. As such it provides an antidote to those positivistic social
sciences which attend to the regularities in phenomena and in relations
between them in a bid to ground themselves and to display their reliability
and wider utility.15 For such disciplines, ideas are often merely super-
structural, concealing deeper processes or hiding preformed objective
interests. By contrast, ideas are taken seriously as social forces by Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA), perhaps the most important neighbouring field to
rhetoric.16 In its investigation of how cultural forms represent, conceal, and
reinforce power inequalities CDA can contribute a great deal to rhetorical
analysis. But it is marked by a certain structuralism, which sees blocs of
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ideas shaping political (and by extension legal) developments on a fairly
large scale over longer time periods. For rhetoric, by contrast, ideas, ideolo-
gies, and discursive forms exist primarily in actual use, that is, in specific
moments of speech or in the production, reception, and appropriation of
texts.17 In other words, they enjoy a distinct and specifically political reality
as they are deployed in argumentation. As Quentin Skinner has shown, ideas
live historically, gaining meaning from their strategic articulation in par-
ticular social and cultural contexts.18 Their contribution to power constella-
tions is, thus, iterative and episodic, rather than simply structural. By contrast
with CDA, therefore, the scale of rhetorical analysis is considerably more
focused spatially and temporally, concentrating on the timeliness (kairos) of
a specific utterance or chain of utterances and their appropriateness to a
concrete problem (stasis).19 CDA does not exhaust the field, of course. For
example, the particularistic focus of rhetoric is shared by critical discursive
psychology. This seeks:
not so much to analyse the changes in society's `large-scale discourses', which
concrete language use can bring about, as to investigate how people use the
available discourses flexibly in creating and negotiating representations of the
world and identities20
in small scale social interaction and to reflect on the consequences of this.
Classical rhetoric provides a well-stocked toolbox of distinctions for
analysing persuasive effects. These include the occasions of speech (that is,
forensic, deliberative, and commemorative); the canons of rhetoric (dis-
covery, arrangement, style, delivery, and memory); figures of speech (meta-
phor, metonymy, synecdoche, and so on); and parts of speech (introduction,
narration, proof, refutation, and conclusion). All can aid in the close reading
of legal materials, and readers are referred to the significant technical
literature on them.21 For present purposes it is most useful to concentrate on
the three modes of proof in rhetoric ± logos, pathos, and ethos ± and the
manner in which they shape legal argumentation.22 Logos refers to the truth,
consistency, and plausibility of the argument itself. Its most important
feature, for present purposes, is the topic. These common-sense assumptions
and distinctions shared between speaker and audience, are almost literally
`places' (topoi) from which an argument can begin. They provide a set of
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pigeonholes (or `topic grid') for categorizing issues and phenomena. Topics
may be general, held by all audiences, or particular to specific disciplines. As
Jack Balkin has argued, law is constituted by a set of heterogeneous topics,
including formal materials, such as precedent cases, statutes, rules of
statutory construction, and so on, as well as maxims, standards, principles,
and policies, but also presumptions about the natural world and the society in
which the law operates.23 Topics are not logically coherent and cannot
compel a unique conclusion. Rather, they are articulated and combined to
make a stronger or weaker case. The may be removed by repeal or
overruling, but are more likely to fade in and out depending on the extent to
which they are used, especially in common law systems.
Pathos involves the evocation of emotions, such as pity, envy, and rage,
in order to gain the approval of the audience for a particular conclusion. This
may be directed towards the speaker herself or a third party referred to in the
speech. Pathos should not be confused with purely subjective emotion. Like
logos it has an important public aspect, drawing on shared feelings and stock
responses which are sustained by a common visual culture.24 It is not
common in judicial rhetoric, which tends to cultivate an air of objectivity as
we have mentioned. Argumentation in controversial medical cases is one
exception to this, as is criminal defence. By contrast, ethos is central to the
persuasive strategies of judges, advocates, and expert witnesses. Empha-
sizing the speaker's authority, it is implicit in the distinctive decoration of
courtrooms, as well as in the citation practices and modes of address adopted
within them. Peter Goodrich has shown how the many ostensibly redundant
usages in legal speech and the common tendency to limit the competence of
the forum (for example, `this court is a court of law, not of morals') are
instances of ethos.25 Novel cases, which show the limits of well-established
topics may lead to more forthright assertions of authority. But the three
modes of proof will usually be combined to some degree. As Roland Barthes
put it, while she speaks the orator must also keep saying, `follow me . . .
esteem me . . . love me'.26
PERFORMING AND PARTICIPATING
This focus on the particular makes rhetoric suitable as a means of taking
seriously the interdependent cultural and political nature of law. We can
follow Luhmann, for these purposes, in understanding law as a series of
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discrete textual and verbal episodes recursively linked to other such
moments by the requirement to show legal validity in distinguishing lawful
from unlawful.27 Thus, for example, pleadings for a case and the decision of
a court itself, are all connected by chains of normative reference to previous
such instances, including precedents, statutory enactments, and binding
executive decrees. Each moment can be studied as an attempt to persuade a
range of audiences of the legal soundness and factual appropriateness of the
outcome and, more broadly, that the normative materials require this
conclusion to be reached.28 Rhetorical criticism draws us into the particular
time and place of these moments of persuasion. It encourages us to take
seriously the contingency of the outcome, the crafting of arguments, and the
pressure of cultural and social forces upon them. As well as the scholar, the
law teacher and her students can only benefit from opening-up inquiry in this
way.29 Rhetoric outflanks orthodox doctrinal analysis which, as we know,
cultivates a certain blindness as to the identity of the speaker and as to the
constitution and location of her audience, and which aims to condense the
actual words of the judge or parliamentarian into a kernel of rules and
principles, with much of what was actually said cast off as mere interpretive
chaff.30 Agency, creativity, and chance are given their due as they are not by
legal formalism and structuralist social theory.31 Law is performance.32 It is
something we do, not something which we have as a result of what we do.33
This understanding of law as argument and performance in the first
instance also points to the manner in which rhetoric indexes law's politics.
Let's go back to Plato. For him government of the polis was most appro-
priately subject to incontestable principles, not localized argument and
contingent decision making.34 As Jacques RancieÁre put it, Plato proposed an
`archipolitics', whereby the noisy to-and-fro of debate and disagreement
would be stilled in favour of metaphysical contemplation.35 This longing for
order has ever since animated the schemes of rationalists seeking to subsume
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politics to some philosophy or other. An opposed formation, associated with
Aristotle, favours republican forms of government, to which argument and,
thus, rhetoric are central. Accordingly, not every dispute can or should be
solved by rigorous philosophical logic.36 Innovation and improvisation in
responding to unforeseen situations are important values which are realized
through context-bound deliberation. More than this, if life in community is
the ultimate end of the person, then public debate about the welfare of the
community is the highest calling upon its citizens and the capacity to speak
and be listened to is the key token of their membership of the political
community.37
Rhetoric, then, is much more than flattery and crowd pleasing; it is the
very substance of democratic life, at least as understood in classical Athens
(a limitation to which we will return). Correlatively, the stifling of debate
constitutes a threat to the liberty not only of individuals, but of the whole
polis.38 Republican revivals in Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe, and
at the inception of the United States of America, were marked by a revalori-
zation of public speech in these terms.39 Against the twentieth century
understanding of politics as domination, Hannah Arendt saw it as a public
space where people articulate and clarify common concerns, though from
different points of view.40 In this dispensation, who can speak, when, and
about what, was and is a matter of constitutional significance. Rhetoric is
intimately concerned with these questions. But, as we have seen, it poses
them, not primarily in terms of abstract principle, but with reference to
concrete verbal and textual practices and the legal `infrastructure' which
sustains them. As such, rhetoric partakes of the `artificiality' which Arendt
saw as a necessary and valuable feature of the public realm.41 And it is by
attending to the artifice of discourse that we can identify an apt mode for
studying and critiquing law politically.
CHALLENGING THE CLASSICS
The modern study of rhetoric dates from the turn of the nineteenth century. A
revival centred on the liberal arts colleges of the United States at this time
was driven by the anxiety of intellectuals, like John Dewey, regarding mass
democracy.42 As Matthew Arnold had argued of an industrializing Victorian
Britain, the newly enfranchised would have to be inducted into full political
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citizenship with the help of classical exemplars.43 In the more deliberative
and less oligarchical culture of the United States, this was ideally provided
through an education in public speaking. A traditionalist, neo-Aristotelian
understanding of rhetoric, as both instrumental and edifying, held sway in the
communication and composition studies departments of these colleges up to
the 1960s when it came under sustained critique.44 The pressure of new social
movements and the `turn to talk' in social theory made rhetoric the focus of a
novel concern with power and inequality. Such challenges to rhetoric took
two forms. First, an external critique of the meanings of the revival project as
a whole; and second, an internal critique of the way in which hierarchy and
exclusion are achieved through rhetorical forms and practices.
The external critique highlights the gendered, raced, and classed nature of
the idea of rhetoric, and the classics more broadly, as reproduced within
European politics and scholarship. Feminist critics note how neo-
Aristotelians take as their privileged object of analysis speech situations
from which women were excluded: the Athenian agora, the Roman forum,
and, until recently, courtrooms and parliamentary chambers.45 The origin
story of rhetoric exalts a masculine ideal, where speech is the instrument of
dutiful and virtuous democrats, who woo and seduce their audiences by
appealing to simple common sense, not philosophical abstraction.46 This
affirmation of rhetorical virility has long been made in the face of sceptics
who castigate rhetoric in feminine terms as the `Harlot of the Arts' or their
mere `handmaiden'.47 The idealized scene of rhetoric was also white and
upper-class, taught and practiced within neo-classical courthouses, national
assemblies, settler mansions, and country houses. The citizenry called to
debate and decide on the good of the commonwealth was narrowly defined,
excluding slaves and other labourers as had been the case at Athens and
Rome.48 RancieÁre calls this Aristotelian conception `parapolitics', broader
than the `archipolitics' of Plato's philosopher kings, but still clearly limited.49
In Britain today, as Martin and Finlayson note, the prestige rhetorical forms
which dominate in parliament, the courts, and the quality media, are most
likely to be acquired at fee-paying schools and in the debating societies of
elite universities.50 Raka Shome has noted that these were also fora where
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`imperial voices were primarily heard and imperial policies articulated'.51
The speech practices of the subaltern largely went undocumented and form no
part of the inherited rhetorical canon.52 Revivalists, she argues, have been
slow to reflect on this exclusive legacy and its contribution to the disciplinary
authority (ethos) of modern studies in rhetoric.53
The internal critique of rhetoric challenged technical conceptions of
speaker, audience, and the relationship between them posited in orthodox
theories. In a landmark monograph of 1965, Edwin Black argued that object
of any rhetorical transaction on the neo-Aristotelian model is a straight-
forward judgement about future, past, or present matters (mapping on to the
traditional typology of deliberative, forensic, and commemorative speech).54
This presumes a set of stable values common to speaker and audience, which
the former appeals to in order to produce the judgement desired. However, as
Black notes, neo-Aristotelianism reaches its limits where such stability is
lacking, say in situations of social pluralism or conflict, which are in truth
more common.55 There, rhetorical transactions aim not so much at the
production of judgement, as at the fostering of shared convictions and
identities. Emotional appeal is more prominent than reason, and often prior,
and it is realized through concrete language, rather than abstract values,
through presenting vivid pictures of `the world as it is', rather than through
principled argumentation. This breaks open the bounded, dyadic and fairly
static model of speaker-audience relations which underpins the
instrumentalist understanding of rhetoric in neo-Aristotelian accounts. It
goes beyond the `linguistic management of an audience's common store of
values' and embraces Lionel Trilling's understanding of culture as
struggle.56
These charges were amplified in the case of law by Peter Goodrich in his
critique of Chaim Perelman's new rhetoric, itself a major effort to revive
Aristotelian traditions as a mode of studying modern argumentation.57
Although gesturing towards `the historical and practical human character of
reason', this is premised on a conception of law's audiences which suffers
from deficiencies similar to those just discussed.58 The legal and extra-legal
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publics of law, on Perelman's account, are already constituted, homogeneous
communities of value. Their acceptance of law's legitimacy is given. What
remains to the rhetorical critic is to study the effective techniques of com-
munication deployed intentionally by legal orators promoting increased
adherence to legal values and, thus, seeking to win adherence to specific
conclusions. As Goodrich notes, this is methodologically unambitious and
politically conservative.59 Ultimately the deployment of classical rhetoric on
its own as a tool for studying contemporary speech is anachronistic and
inadequate to the purposes of socio-legal scholars. It cannot grasp the
dynamics of institutional power and social inequality which give shifting
content to legal semantics. 60 More is needed.
CONSTITUTING, EXCLUDING, SILENCING
Our task then is to challenge the given-ness and presumed unity of the
audience, and also the given-ness and pure intentionality of the speaker.
Critics suggest that in doing this we need to accept that rhetoric can have a
constitutive force, beyond its straightforwardly persuasive effects. An origin
point for this approach is to be found in Wayne Booth's notion of the
`implied author', an ideal created over the course of a given text by the
physical author through stylistic and other devices.61 Edwin Black opened
out this insight into a more wide-ranging theory of rhetorical personae.62 As
little as the speaker (or first persona), the audience of rhetoric should not be
conflated with physical listeners and readers. Rather, stylistic tokens and
topics deployed in the discourse implied an ideal auditor (or second
persona), which the actual listeners could aspire to become. Like the speaker,
the audience is a strategic effect of discourse. Maurice Charland's work
provides a good example of this, showing how QueÂbec separatist leaders in
the 1970s did more than simply put the case for independence to their
listeners and readers.63 Rather they called forth (or `interpellated') the latter
as a coherent `Peuple QueÂbecois', drawing on historical narratives of
linguistic subordination and discrimination. Support for independence was
not then a matter for rational judgement, but rather presumed to be already
inherent in the collective and individual identities of those addressed.
This widening of critical focus to include a constitutive dimension, has
been proposed for legal rhetoric by James Boyd White. For him lawyers'
speech is an argument not only about reasons and results, but also identities.
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More than an art of persuasion, it creates and re-creates its objects by
drawing on available discursive resources within and beyond the law. A
legal instrument contingently creates `speakers, roles, topics and occasions
for speech'.64 It borrows from its own and neighbouring areas of law to do
so, for example, contract models of informed consent in medical law, but
also from the wider culture, for example, popular and literary stereotypes of
health care users, say.65 Boyd White takes the United States Constitution,
with its allocation of powers, rights, and duties, as the pre-eminent example
of such a legal-rhetorical text.66 That essentially republican instrument
called forth a group of speakers as full members of the political community,
while others (for example, African-Americans) have been directly or
indirectly excluded for much of its career. The same is true of legislation,
such as the English Mental Capacity Act 2005, and the common law regime
which preceded it, which we will be examining in the following sections. For
Boyd White, law's central question is `what kind of community should we
be?' ± a question to be answered by reflecting critically on just this
allocation of roles, identities, and rhetorical positions.67
The first and second personae of rhetoric are produced affirmatively: this
is who I am, this is you are, this is who we are, as lawyers, as fellow
nationals, and so on. But the critical turn in rhetorical theory has taken us
beyond this reciprocal relationship. In a germinal paper Paul Wander
proposed that ideal audiences are constituted as much in negation as in
affirmation. A `third persona' may be evoked as `the silhouette of the second
persona', helping to define speaker and audience, and the relationship
between them.68 Wander thus reads Martin Heidegger's lectures on art at the
University of Frankfurt in 1936 for the manner in which they define the
`enemies' of the Nazi regime by implication, most especially persecuted
Jews. These are audiences `beyond the claims of morality and the bonds of
compassion'.69 They may overhear the rhetorical exchange, but they are
barred from taking part. Building on this, Diana Cloud identifies as the `null
persona' of rhetoric potential speakers who censor themselves, through
evasive answers or feigned ignorance in the face of threatened violence or
discrimination.70 Her theoretical advance emerges out of interviews with
African-American cotton-mill workers in the Deep South of the United
States. Silence she argues, can be fully rhetorical, violating audience
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expectations and signifying, however obliquely.71 Adding the third and null
personae to our critical repertoire takes us well away from `the warmth of the
polis', as evoked by neo-classical rhetoricians, and towards a more adequate
understanding of speech in pluralistic and conflicted societies, and in the
legal practices which sustain them.72 In so far as law is rhetorical, it is an
argument about these constitutional issues, of inclusion and exclusion, as
much as about tactics for persuasion. This rhetorical politics of law is central
to the rest of our analysis.
PERSUADING: MENTAL CAPACITY AND BEST INTERESTS
Mental capacity law governs when a person is treated as being capable of
making legally valid decisions and performing legal acts. It establishes
mechanisms to fill the legal void when a person is regarded as incapable of
making such decisions for themselves, for example, by defining what is in
their best interests. The field of English mental capacity law is ripe for
rhetorical study. For one thing, criteria for determining mental capacity are
relatively open-ended; assessment is situation-specific, informed by the
bodies of knowledge and the values of those professing expertise in this
area.73 For another, application of the best-interests test depends on the
weighing of a number of factors, none of which is given lexical priority in
the relevant legislation.74 As a result, in both cases decision making is
subject to significant and obvious indeterminacy in seeming contravention of
orthodox rule of law values. As Jonathan Montgomery pointed out,
judgments in this area are heavily fact-based, tending towards concrete
description and away from abstract normative elaboration.75 The parties,
their families, and the expert witnesses involved are commonly described in
some detail and their evidence reproduced at length and with care. The idiom
is commonly richer, more metaphorical, and more anecdotal than in more
technical fields. At most, mental capacity and best-interests judgments are
presented as illustrating broadly expressed values, rather than proceeding in
deductive fashion from legal rules or developing new law incrementally.76
Increasingly judges seek to convince diverse publics of the fairness of their
rulings, and of the legitimacy of courts deciding vital questions concerning
vulnerable persons, rather than their next of kin, which seems to be the
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expectation of majority of the general public.77 These two purposes call forth
a conspicuous effort, one aimed at persuasion, which can be studied using
the tools of classical rhetoric set out above.
The rhetorical history of this area is one of change, though not, it should
be added, one of inexorable progress. Subject primarily to common law until
the mid-2000s, judicial decision making on capacity and best interests was
initially marked by substantial deference to medical opinion and, as such,
formed a consistent part of the wider health law field. The test of negligence
in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee78 enjoyed dominance
across a range of controversial medical issues well beyond its proper field of
liability for malpractice. Predicating the lawfulness of procedures on
conformity with the views of a `responsible body of medical practitioners',
the test effectively subjected issues such as non-voluntary sterilization and
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients, to the
judgement of doctors as to patients' best interests with very limited external
scrutiny.79 In effect clinical judgement was adopted as a place (topos, topic)
to which the indeterminacy of legal decision making on medical matters
could be displaced and hopefully concealed.80
Within the terms developed by RancieÁre, `Bolamized' medical law
instantiated a Platonic archipolitics, whereby legal argument was stilled by
being subsumed to clinical reason. The significant audience for this was
accordingly composed of a tightly defined community of senior doctors and
judges, sustained by the shared culture of British elites in that period. Liberal
and feminist scholars, Ian Kennedy and Sally Sheldon, for example, con-
demned this ratification of medical paternalism.81 The ethical charge for
their critique was supplied variously by Kantian and Millian work on
individual autonomy.82 The right to refuse and (somewhat more problem-
atically) to demand treatment was central to these interventions. In substance
they proposed to replace the concrete and distinctively English idiom of the
gentleman practitioner and his dependent patient, encompassed by the
national project of the NHS, with a normative language, aimed at what
Chaim Perelman called a universal audience, unbound by time and place.83
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But the academic challenge should also be understood in republican terms
as a demand for the widening of audiences and permitted speakers in debates
on health care. This meta-rhetorical claim was pressed at all levels and
instances, for example, in the case of patients encountering doctors in the
clinic, but equally by pro-choice groups challenging predominantly male
authority in parliament, the churches, and the professions.84 The proposed
widening of speakers and addresses inevitably means a diminution in the
range of shared common sense and a fracturing in the community called
forth by legal rhetoric. The challenge has met with some, though not
complete, success.85 Rather than an even transition to rhetorical universalism
as per Perelman, we observe a pluralistic landscape. Rights to participate in
deliberation are conceded, and then partially withdrawn or qualified. More
nuanced presentation of his or her situation may lead to an individual's
wishes being denied rather than granted.86 Far from tending towards a
coherent recognition of rights, the multiplication of audiences often subjects
decision making to a confusion of populist voices. We explore each of these
phenomena with reference to the career of the Mental Capacity Act 2005
which can be taken as a hinge point in the shift from the old to the new legal
rhetoric in this area.
EMPOWERING: THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT
The political significance and interpretive horizon of the Mental Capacity
Act 2005 (MCA) can be investigated by asking what was its `rhetorical
situation'? In other words, what issue or `exigence' was it presented as
addressing, and how was its manner of doing so made plausible?87 The
classical notions of stasis and kairos, which we mentioned above, can help in
this.88 Stasis corresponds to the quaestio in Roman law. Accordingly, the
issue is narrowed down and defined with reference to certain topics which
also suggest how it can be resolved.89 In this regard, the aim of the Act as
passed is now widely taken to be that of protecting the right of individuals to
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make decisions about their own lives wherever possible.90 However, that
understanding of the 2005 Act, as one whose primary aim is to empower, is
at odds with earlier iterations of its development. At the inception of the
reform process a decade earlier, the Law Commission's chief concern had
been with the lack of clear statutory provision for making health and welfare
decisions on behalf of `incapable' persons.91 This had left caregivers at risk
of liability for negligence or even battery if they acted without capable
consent. The situational `exigence' calling forth a rhetorical response was,
thus, defined first and foremost as a legal lacuna, rather than an ethical
deficit. Legislative proposals at this stage certainly included individual
autonomy in the topic grid of factors defining the problem, but this was
positioned as a competing interest to be balanced against others rather than
the central impetus for reform itself.92
By contrast, the final draft bill of 2003 was unambiguously presented as
an instrument to empower people. It would ensure that if some mishap befell
them, they would not be treated as completely incapable and denied all
opportunity to make decisions. In so far as they were identifiable, past
expressed wishes could influence ± or even determine ± the decisions to be
made on their behalf.93 The exigence had, thus, been redefined as one of
insufficient respect for the self-determination of disabled people or anyone
who might one day lack capacity. The topic grid was adapted, with
autonomy interests now prioritized through presumptions contained in s. 1 of
the Act and detailed implementation provisions in the Mental Capacity Act
Code of 2007.94
The shift in definition can grasped by returning to the notion of kairos
which suggests that speech is prompted by the demands of a particular
political conjuncture, and that it can be judged with the reference to whether
it responds aptly and in good time. At a general level the `moment' of the
MCA was defined by the New Labour administration which came to power
in 1997 and which consistently articulated its ambitions in the temporal
idiom of renewal and modernization. Empowerment was a central theme in
the government's neo-liberal approach to social policy, from labour activa-
317
90 For example, see H.M. Government, Valuing Every Voice, Respecting Every Right:
Making the Case for the Mental Capacity Act. The Government's Response to the
House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2014;
Cm. 8884); and House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post-Legislative Scrutiny (HL 2013±14 139).
91 Law Commission, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An
Overview (1991) 5.
92 id., p. 9.
93 Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA), Draft Mental Incapacity Bill (2003;
Cm. 5859).
94 See Lord Falconer of Thoroton, `Foreword' to DCA, Mental Capacity Act Code of
Practice (2007).
ß 2019 The Authors. Journal of Law and Society published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Cardiff University (CU)
tion strategies to the part-marketization of public services.95 Law reform was
headlined by the passage of the Human Rights Act in 1998. These general
coordinates were matched by the ascendancy of pro-autonomy perspectives
across relevant sections of the academy, legal practice and, increasingly, the
judiciary.96 At a very basic level, extant paternalism was condemned as more
suitable to an earlier age of deference (the 1950s, say) and so `out of time'.
As regards public expectations, law was taken to be `in the rear and limping
a little', in the words of a frequently quoted dictum from Australia.97
It would be wrong, however, to cast the turn to `empowerment' as wholly
novel. The common law goes forward looking backwards. Its rhetorical
substance is never abruptly amputated. Among the liberal virtues claimed for
the MCA are its `value-neutrality' as regards individual choices, whereby
capacity is to be analysed only with reference to how a person makes a
decision, rather than the outcome of that decision.98 This stance is not wholly
novel but, rather, has played a consistent if supplementary role in the history
of English lunacy and capacity law.99 Thus the Act builds on long-standing
protection for what today are known as `unwise decisions', previously
termed `eccentricity', a concept which allowed courts to avoid the harsh
consequences of a finding of insanity from which it was sharply
distinguished. Thus, in the 1862 case of `mad' Windham, the court refused
to find the man involved `insane' ± meaning he would be divested of control
over his property and person ± merely because `that he was in the habit of
driving a railway engine, and that he had purchased a complete suit like a
guard.'100 The space for such `eccentricity' is seen as being uniquely
available in England. As Lord Reid put it in
We have too often seen freedom disappear in other countries not only by coups
d'eÂtat but by gradual erosion: and often it is the first step that counts. So it
would be unwise to make even minor concessions.101
`Location' of judicial reasoning in that way has continued in the Court of
Protection established under the MCA with the frequent citation of Magna
Carta and J.S. Mill's On Liberty, as if they were quasi-sources of law.102 The
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rhetorical action in each of these cases consists of more than a bare appeal
for adherence to ethical principles. Rather, as Maurice Charland's work on
QueÂbecois nationalism suggests, what is attempted here is the construction of
an audience already committed to a certain kind of liberalism by virtue of its
national identity. Having inquired into the broad political common sense
instantiated by the 2005 Act, we now move to a more detailed scale,
inquiring this time into the changing rhetorical situation of mental capacity
and best interests hearings themselves.
GOVERNING SPEECH, CONSTITUTING SPEAKERS
We saw above that the critics of neo-Aristotelian rhetoric challenged its
preponderant focus on the relationship between speakers and listeners,
writers and readers. They proposed a more thoroughgoing inquiry into the
constitution of all parties to the rhetorical exchange. They asked hard
questions regarding the exclusion and self-silencing of some audiences. This
newer approach is `critical' in its concern with power and inequality. But it
also remains `rhetorical' in its attention to concrete speech situations and the
verbal and textual strategies deployed within them. Audiences are called
forth or marginalized as a result of the creative work of speakers and writers.
Of course, there are significant apparatuses of coercion, particularly asso-
ciated with law, and congealed patterns (or structures) of meaning and
common sense. But these are only ever of political significance as they are
more or less successfully performed in specific times and places. The section
picks out three key features of the rhetorical situation here and poses the
issues as a series of questions: how is P portrayed (or `represented') in
judicial opinions and doctrinal figures? Who is addressed by decision-
makers in these cases? Can P speak in the course of such proceedings? Must
they?
Before proceeding we should admit that our use of the term `P' here is
itself a rhetorical move worthy of critical attention. In judicial texts the letter
functions as a cipher to protect the anonymity of the individual at the centre
of the case. It may be that this usage contributes to the distancing of those
individuals from the decision-making process in the manner that we discuss
in the following sub-section. Moreover, what P stands for is not settled. It
may be `patient', which supports a medicalization of the issues in these cases
and has connotations of now unfashionable paternalism. It may be `person',
which avoids these connotations.
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1. How is P represented?
Two cases in the late 1980s saw the House of Lords faced with the legal
lacuna noted in relation to decision making for people lacking capacity.103
The cases concerned proposals to sterilize incompetent adult women. In
both, the court's ruling was effectively determined by medical opinion
through the imposition of Bolam as the test of best interests. This move was
made plausible on the basis of how P's situation and P themselves were
portrayed (or `represented', a productively ambivalent term which we use
hereafter). Thus, the exigence justifying irreversible sterilization ± most
notably, uncontrolled sexual appetite and an inability to practice
contraception consistently ± proceeded from P's flawed and vulnerable
condition.104 As classical writers noted, physical performance (actio) can
make an important contribution to the persuasive effort. But in these cases, P
deviated from the ideally self-contained, able, and male body presumed by
law and indeed classical rhetoric. Instead, as Judith Butler's work on the
performative nature of gender and sexuality would suggest, their assumed
physical state meant they lacked authority (ethos) and were disqualified from
participating in the process.105 Little or no reference was made to their
wishes or personal perspective, much less to the deficiencies of social and
medical care which rendered them vulnerable to abuse and unwanted
pregnancies.106
Criticisms of this approach led the Court of Appeal to expand the scope of
analysis required.107 Accordingly, Bolam would establish the range of
medically acceptable interventions, but the judge had to make a further
choice between them based on social, personal, and emotional factors
particular to P. The comprehensive evaluation, according to one influential
judgment, would be structured in the tabular form of a balance sheet.108 As
this two-dimensional figure suggests, the new regime fell short of producing
a nuanced and detailed representation of P.109 These doctrinal developments
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widened the intended audience or `second persona' of judicial rhetoric to
include non-medical, as well as medical professionals. But Ps themselves
were still left mute, positioned on the margins of discourse, as third
personae, the objects of a more or less reductive representation in terms of
clinical medicine or, increasingly, social welfare.
The MCA, which came into force after this series of cases, was widely
taken to be challenging such exclusion, as we noted above. Indeed s. 4(6) of
the Act expressly lists the wishes and prior expressed values of P among the
factors to be taken into account in applying the statutory test of best interests.
But has the intended shift in the rhetorical culture been realized? While it is
still rare for Ps themselves to challenge an assessment of mental incapacity
(or a best-interests decision), outcome-oriented tests, which allow their
views to be outflanked openly, are now taken to be indefensible. Courts
increasingly assert that capacity is a matter to be determined by the judge,
who must not simply defer to expert testimony.110 By the same measure and
in contrast with the earlier cases, a detailed character-sketch of P is
increasingly offered in such decisions.
The 2015 Court of Protection decision in Kings College NHSFT v. C111 to
uphold a patient's refusal of life-sustaining haemodialysis showcases ten-
sions in this new regime. At first glance MacDonald J's decision was in
many way an orthodox performance of judicial liberalism: starting from
commonplaces like Lord Donaldson's affirmation in Re T (Adult: Refusal of
Treatment)112 that P was entitled to refuse medical treatment for any reason
or none at all; setting out verbatim relevant sections from the MCA, an
earnest of fidelity to the legal text as original source of his ruling (discovery);
and positioning himself as a careful decision maker (ethos), by stating that
the case was `difficult' and `finely balanced'.113 However, the judge's cool
self-representation contrasted sharply with his rendering of C's life as a tale
of decline into ill health and indignity after a season of high living. He
depicted her circumstances in vivid, almost visual terms, drawing on quota-
tions from C herself.114 The appurtenances of her former life were listed ±
for example, four husbands, a taste for Veuve Cliquot champagne ± along
with an enduring desire to avoid becoming fat and being unable to wear a
bikini, and her present wish `to go out with a bang'.115 The inevitable
connotation here was one of superficiality manifest (again!) in P's body.
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Indeed, C's expressed desire only to live a life that `sparkles' provided a
nickname for the case in the media. Though her refusal of treatment was
upheld, MacDonald J's fuller portrait of C ironically draws us away from
liberal neutrality and abstraction. Rather, in its dense narrative quality it
takes the form of a parable, pointing to the wages of frivolity and warning of
moral consequences beyond the causal understanding of biomedicine.116 To
the extent that the mode of representation (judgmental) cuts against the
substantive outcome (neutral) two incompatible communities (one moral-
istic, one liberal) are called forth by the text. All the while effective
rhetorical capacity is still denied to P.117
2. Who is addressed?
We have seen that P is commonly spoken about in judicial decisions. But to
what extent are they directly spoken to? To a significant degree the range of
addressees can be inferred from the style and language of judgments under
the MCA. The great majority of these are cast in dense and technical terms
unlikely to be intelligible to most Ps unaided or their families, suggesting
that fellow lawyers and health care and social work professionals are the
ideal auditors of judicial speech in the first instance. On occasion, it is true,
judgments include content that is specifically directed to P, as with these
comments from Mr Justice Peter Jackson, as he then was:
I hope that you will be happy when you return home. If you accept the support
you will be getting from district nurses and carers it may be possible for you to
stay there. If you do not accept that support you will probably have to return to
a care home.118
The same judge broke further ground in a recent family court ruling by
writing an entire judgment in simple English intended to be accessible to
parents with learning disabilities.119 Both of the foregoing were laudable
initiatives, but they remain marginal. Thus, the direct address to P was
carefully framed as a digression, suggesting by contradistinction that the rest
of the judgment was not intended to be read by them. Equally, a study of 251
health and welfare files in the Court of Protection identified only one case
where the judge had written an explanatory letter to the subject of the case to
explain their decision, much less draft a whole judgment in comprehensible
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language.120 In fact there are considerably more examples of Ps being
expressly excluded from learning the content of judgments concerning them,
or the fact they have been given in the first place. Orders have been made,
for example, directing that nobody should communicate to P that the media
was allowed to report on their case or to bring such reports to their attention,
or to inform them that they would be subject to a court-ordered caesarean
section and sterilization.121 It is possible that the judgments were to be read
by the parties after the procedures had been carried out but, again, the
elaborate legalistic language in which they were cast suggests that that was
not the intention of the court. Even more than in cases of inadequate repre-
sentation like Kings College NHSFT v. C, the denial of rhetorical capacity
here is forceful and direct, and it corresponds to the dramatic outcomes
imposed.
While the inclusion of Ps as addressees has been uneven, a steadier
widening is evident as regards the media. Newspapers have long focused
critically on legal developments in this area. Most vocal among them has
been the Daily Mail which early on cast the MCA as part of `a culture war',
promoted by `legal commissars' and aimed at `subverting family values'.122
State-backed professionals intervene between Ps and their next of kin; the
Court of Protection materializes as `the judge in the living room'; and an
ordinary `gran' can be jailed for hugging her granddaughter.123 These inter-
ventions are clearly anti-state ± condemned as `the coldest of cold monsters'
by one Sunday Times columnist ± and structured by the antinomy between
England (homely and commonsensical) and continental Europe (authori-
tarian and ideology-driven).124 This hostility was originally compounded by
the rule that hearings should generally be held in private given their intimate
subject matter.125 Repeated complaints in the media that the Court of
Protection was operating as a `secret court' has registered with senior judges,
who wonder aloud whether they operate with the `consent' of society.126 In
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response, the past ten years has seen a move towards greater `transparency',
with larger numbers of Court of Protection judgments being published, and
most health and welfare hearings open to the media and the general public,
albeit subject to routine court orders prohibiting the communication of
identifying or other restricted information.127 The audience for decision-
making has thus widened. Whereas formerly the media merely overheard
judicial rhetoric, now they are directly addressed, moving from third to
second persona. Moreover, they occupy a relatively privileged position
channelling the views of society and helping to constitute it as that audience
which is the source of the Court's legitimacy.
3. Who speaks?
Concerns regarding inadequate representation and limited address may be at
least partly met, if P is allowed to participate directly in capacity and best
interests proceedings. Notwithstanding its timely orientation to individual
autonomy, however, no such provision was included in the MCA or in the
Court of Protection Rules 2007 as initially drafted when the Act came into
force. Although P is usually joined as a party, they are almost inevitably
found to lack litigation capacity and are represented by a litigation friend,
who advances the case based on their view of P's best interests. Moreover,
until recently judges exercising jurisdiction over health and welfare matters
only rarely held personal meetings with Ps or sought evidence from them.128
Impetus for change came from the European Court of Human Rights which,
in a 2008 ruling, required judges in legal capacity proceedings to have actual
contact with the individuals concerned.129 In 2015 the Court of Protection
Rules were accordingly amended to require judges to facilitate such engage-
ment.130 It is unclear how far this has changed existing practice and how
frequently Ps now participate in health and welfare proceedings. High-
profile cases such as Wye Valley NHS Trust v. B, where a meeting with P
enabled the court to `to get a deeper understanding of [his] personality', have
foregrounded the importance of this.131 Unfortunately, however, the Court of
Protection's infrastructure ± both physical, administrative, and legal ± is not
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geared towards the routine participation of people who may have complex
physical, cognitive, psychosocial or health needs.132
It is clear then, as a matter of law at least, that Ps may speak and that the
court should facilitate this.133 But can they be obliged to do so? Case law on
this is uneven. In 2011 the Court of Protection held that refusing to submit to
a capacity assessment is not of itself evidence of incapacity.134 By contrast in
2014 it endorsed the forcible removal of an adult woman with autism
spectrum disorder from her home for education and capacity assessment
regarding contraception.135 Here we encounter a paradox: the empowering
ambitions of the MCA may depend on actual or threatened force. Even short
of that extreme situation, as Derek Morgan and Kenneth Veitch argued, P's
rhetorical performance in consultations may determine the outcome of the
capacity test, particularly where he or she is refusing life-sustaining treat-
ment.136 Notwithstanding the formal separation of the evaluation of capacity
from best interests, and the presumption in favour of capacity in s. 1(2) of the
Act, it is to be feared that patients will come under pressure to argue
coherently with reference to their own biography and values, in order to be
found competent to refuse. As Marinos Diamantides put it, they must display
`a proactive attitude toward their suffering [t]hey must speak of it', thereby
reassuring the court and helping it in turn to persuade its own diverse
audiences within and beyond the legal system.137 Lord Donaldson's dictum
in Re T, mentioned above, that a patient need not give any reasons for
refusing treatment is, thus, not always borne out in practice. Instead, the
capacity test is itself a further rhetorical situation, one in which P is called
forth as speaker and in which silence or near silence may count against him
or her.
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CONCLUSION
This essay is offered as an introduction (or re-introduction) to rhetoric for
socio-legal scholars and a brief demonstration of its potential in the specific
context of mental capacity law. Our aim has been to show that rhetorical
categories provide a useful framework for analysing legal communications
in detail, and for clarifying difficult questions regarding inequality, respect,
and participation. We have showcased both classical and critical approaches
in doing so. Classical rhetoric draws our attention to specific interventions
and the terms in which they are cast. It is an instrument of what Michael
Calvin McGee called `cultural surgery', revealing the common sense, the
collectively produced emotions, and the discursive forms of authority which
are dominant in a given era, or in a given discipline (like law) and its sub-
disciplines.138 We saw that the case law on the rights of people with
disabilities in England and Wales was a site for the reproduction and trans-
formation of cultural materials in this way. Rhetoric, thus, offers a means of
connecting law with its social contexts without sacrificing nuance and
without overlooking the agency of diverse legal actors.
Critical rhetoric invites us to consider what SeÂamus Heaney called
`government of the tongue': the ethics of speech situations in pluralistic and
antagonistic societies, quite different from the bounded and stable scene
denoted by the Athenian agora and the Roman forum.139 More than simply
pointing out the fact that certain groups are marginalized or silenced,
however, critics concern themselves with how this is realized tactically in
discourse, and with how it is challenged. Law provides the infrastructure for
these moves and countermoves. Statutory provisions and court procedure, as
well as the practice of individual judges, shape the ability of people, such as
those with disabilities, to speak effectively of their condition and of their
wishes. They are included (or excluded) as addressees along with others such
as the media and members of various professions. Changing these rules is a
key stake in the politics of mental capacity and in many other fields.
Rhetoric in both classical and critical modes can help us to refurbish the
republican politics of speech favoured by renaissance thinkers and revived
by Hannah Arendt, among others, in the twentieth century. On this view the
ability to participate in debate and deliberation, or what we might call
rhetorical capacity, is an index of one's inclusion in the public sphere and,
thus, a mark of citizenship. That sphere includes the law courts and any other
official or non-official forum in which rights and interests are decided. Even
the most intimate matters ± of life and death, sexual expression, and human
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reproduction ± are made public once they come within the purview of the
law.140 Failures of address and limitations on speaking rights in such cases,
and more generally, amount to a denial of rhetorical capacity in law and an
abrogation of effective citizenship.
(This article is the second in a series introducing the reader to methods and
theories relevant to advancing socio-legal research. They are written for the
curious rather than the expert reader and provide illustrations of how the
theories, methods, and frameworks have been employed and might be used in
your work.)
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